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Abstract
Some alternative medicines enjoy widespread use, and in certain situations are preferred over conventional, validated
treatments in spite of the fact that they fail to prove effective when tested scientifically. We propose that the causal illusion,
a basic cognitive bias, underlies the belief in the effectiveness of bogus treatments. Therefore, the variables that modulate
the former might affect the latter. For example, it is well known that the illusion is boosted when a potential cause occurs
with high probability. In this study, we examined the effect of this variable in a fictitious medical scenario. First, we showed
that people used a fictitious medicine (i.e., a potential cause of remission) more often when they thought it caused no side
effects. Second, the more often they used the medicine, the more likely they were to develop an illusory belief in its
effectiveness, despite the fact that it was actually useless. This behavior may be parallel to actual pseudomedicine usage;
that because a treatment is thought to be harmless, it is used with high frequency, hence the overestimation of its
effectiveness in treating diseases with a high rate of spontaneous relief. This study helps shed light on the motivations
spurring the widespread preference of pseudomedicines over scientific medicines. This is a valuable first step toward the
development of scientifically validated strategies to counteract the impact of pseudomedicine on society.
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Introduction
In today’s knowledge-based society, the wide-spread use and
popularity of certain alternative medicines, such as homeopathy,
continues to be increasingly troublesome for health authorities
worldwide. While rigorous scientific studies have repeatedly shown
that homeopathy is completely ineffective (no more effective than
placebo [1]), many patients still choose to use it or other
pseudomedicines in place of conventional treatments that have
been proven effective. This decision results in important conse-
quences, sometimes death [2]. Therefore, one may ask why people
prefer to use homeopathy and other alternative medicines over
scientifically tested medicines. One possible answer is that the
alleged lack of side effects of most alternative medicines (in the case
of homeopathy, we assume no side effects because the main
ingredient is water) makes the treatment more attractive than
conventional scientific medicines, which frequently include
unpleasant side effects. While most would agree that people
frequently resort to those treatments they believe are more
effective, we propose that the reverse also holds: frequent use of a
treatment, because of the lack of side effects or other consider-
ations, fuels the belief that it is effective, even when it is not.
It has been previously suggested that a basic cognitive bias,
known as the causal illusion, underlies many irrational beliefs,
particularly beliefs in the effectiveness of pseudomedicines [3]. The
causal illusion is the illusory perception of a contingency between a
potential cause and the outcome of interest when they are actually
not causally related. In this case, the contingency is between the
use of a treatment and the recovery from a disease. A useless
treatment is one that does not increase the probability of healing
when it is used. That is, the probability of healing remains the
same whether or not the treatment is used, P(Healing|Treatment)
= P(Healing|–|Treatment), and hence the contingency between
the two events (treatment and healing) is zero. In recent decades,
experimental psychologists have identified a number of conditions
that promote the overestimation of zero-contingencies. We argue
that the way pseudomedicines are typically used meets the
conditions that, according to recent research on causal illusions,
facilitate the overestimation of causality, and therefore the belief in
the effectiveness of completely useless treatments.
One variable that researchers have identified as a robust
facilitator of the causal illusion, at least in controlled experiments,
is the probability of the desired outcome. The illusion would
appear more prominent when the healings occur with high
probability, even if they are not correlated with the use of the
treatment [4], [5], [6]. Another variable of interest is the
probability of occurrence of the potential cause, P(Cause).
Following the example above, P(Cause) is the probability that a
patient uses the treatment when she is sick. Thus, in this particular
context one can also refer to it as P(Treatment). Basic research
suggests that the more often a patient takes a completely useless
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medicine, the more likely she will develop a belief in its
effectiveness. This is particularly true when the desired outcome
(the healing) takes place frequently [7], [8].
The effect of P(Cause) on causal judgments has been widely
documented in computer-based experiments. These studies are
generally theory-focused experiments and could, in principle,
make use of any context or scenario, be it real or fictional, in which
causal relationships could be assessed by participants. In fact,
many of them use medical scenarios as cover-stories in which the
potential cause to be evaluated is a fictitious treatment, and the
desired outcome is a fictitious patient recovering from a disease
[7]. Therefore, the researchers found that P(Treatment) signifi-
cantly affects the participants’ effectiveness judgments of a
treatment, at least in these fictitious scenarios. These studies
suggest the inversion of what one could take as the obvious
relationship between the mentioned variables, P(Treatment) and
belief in the effectiveness of the treatment. The obvious
relationship is that people’s belief in the effectiveness of a
treatment will influence P(Treatment), the probability that they
use the treatment. The inverse, less intuitive, relationship is that
irrespective of people’s initial expectations, the mere increase in
P(Treatment) will increase people’s belief in the effectiveness of the
treatment. That is, the experiments suggest that it is the frequent
use of the medicine that results in the illusion of its effectiveness.
Moreover, previous experiments show that, when not influ-
enced or instructed by the experimenters, people naturally tend to
introduce the target cause (i.e., to use the potential treatment), in
more than half of the occasions [7], [9] (see [10] for more general
evidence in a neutral scenario). That is, the spontaneous tendency
is to use the treatment with high probability, and this normally
leads to an illusory perception of effectiveness. Still, it is possible to
influence this spontaneous behavior. The manipulation of
P(Cause), or P(Treatment), has been achieved in different ways
in fictitious experimental scenarios. For instance, (a) by means of
explicit instructions about the rate with which the cause should be
introduced [8], [10], [11] or (b) by manipulating the availability of
the potential cause [12]. These studies showed that increasing
P(Cause) facilitates the development of the illusion, while
decreasing P(Cause) reduces it. However, the studies directly
restricted P(Cause) [12] or at least suggested the adequate
P(Cause) that participants should expose themselves to [8], [10].
In this study, our goal was to move one step back and get a glimpse
of the actual variability in P(Treatment). We wanted to know
which preceding factors determined the probability of using the
treatment in real life situations, and whether we could influence
P(Treatment) without explicit instructions or limiting the partic-
ipant’s access to the treatment.
In a recent study, Barberia et al. [9] were able to reliably reduce
the natural tendency of high school students to introduce a
potential cause (i.e., to use a fictitious medicine on a series of
fictitious patients) by using an educational intervention explaining
the rationale of causal inference, which conforms the basic
principle of scientific reasoning and experimental design. In line
with this study, we suggest another factor that might indirectly
affect the otherwise frequent use of a useless treatment, hence
developing a causal illusion of effectiveness. This factor is the
presence of side effects produced by the treatment. To our
knowledge, this factor has not been manipulated in experimental
research. Manipulating this variable may be an effective and very
natural way of modulating the cost associated with treatment, and
therefore should have an observable impact on the probability of
introducing the potential cause (i.e, the treatment). If correct, we
would also detect differences in the development of causal
illusions, depending on the presence of side-effects.
To sum up, we propose that one of the reasons why people
continue to believe in the effectiveness of bogus treatments is their
alleged lack of side effects. Because there is no harm in using
homeopathy (i.e., the cost associated with using the treatment is
very low), it is used frequently. In certain conditions where the
base rate of spontaneous remission is high (such as headache, back
pain, flu, etc.), the experimental research on contingency learning
and causal illusions clearly suggests that introducing the potential
cause with high frequency results in overestimation of the
effectiveness of the treatment. This would generate a vicious circle
in which pseudomedicines are frequently used because they imply
low cost (e.g., no harm), and in turn, high rates of pseudomedicine
use contributes to an illusory perception of effectiveness, thus
reinforcing further consumption.
In our experiment, we adapt the standard contingency learning
task that has been used in previous experiments [3] to include a
manipulation of the cost associated with using the treatment based
on the presence of side effects. Our prediction is that, because a
lack of side effects encourages the use of the treatment with high
probability, it facilitates the illusory belief that the treatment is
working.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The ethical review board of the University of Deusto examined
and approved the procedure used in this experiment, as a part of a
larger research project (Ref: ETK-44/12-13).
Participants and Apparatus
Seventy-nine anonymous first-year Psychology students from
the Universidad Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia (UNED,
Spain) volunteered to take part in the study through the virtual
laboratory website [http://www.labpsico.deusto.es] as an optional
course activity. No personal information (age, gender) was
collected. The computer program assigned each participant to
one of two groups, a high-cost group and a no-cost group. Data
from five participants were removed because the medicine was not
administered to any patient during the session. Thus, the final
sample consisted of 74 participants, 39 of whom were in the high-
cost group, and 35 in the no-cost group. The experiment was
programmed in JavaScript, a web-based language that is interpret-
able by most browsers.
The participants were informed before the experiment that they
could quit the study at any moment by closing the browser
window. The data collected during the experiment were sent
anonymously to the experimenter only upon explicit permission by
the participant, indicated by clicking on a "Submit" button. If the
participant clicked on the "Cancel" button, the information was
erased. No personal information (i.e., name, IP address, e-mail)
was collected. In agreement with the ethical guidelines for
Internet-based research [13], we did not use cookies or other
software to covertly obtain information from the participants.
Procedure and Design
We adapted a standard contingency learning paradigm that has
been extensively used in the literature [14]. Participants were
individually presented with a computer task in which they were
asked to imagine that they were medical doctors working in an
emergency care facility. They were told that crises induced by a
dangerous disease called "Lindsay syndrome" should be stopped
immediately. Each participant was to heal as many patients as
possible. To this end, participants could use a medicine called
Batatrim but, since this medicine was still experimental, its
Belief in Pseudomedicine as Casual Illusion
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effectiveness in treating the disease had not yet been proven. The
high-cost group was informed that Batatrim would produce a
severe and permanent skin rash as a side effect in every patient
who takes it. The no-cost group was not told about any side effect.
(An English translation of the full instructions is available as
supporting material Instructions S1.)
After reading the instructions, 50 medical records of different
fictitious patients were presented sequentially. Each record
contained a picture showing the patient suffering from the
syndrome (i.e., a greenish head covered in beads of sweat)
together with a sentence stating that the patient was suffering from
a crisis provoked by the syndrome. Immediately below was the
question, "Would you like to give Batatrim to this patient?" The
participant then indicated his decision by clicking on a "Yes" or
"No" button. Upon giving the answer, a message indicated
whether Batatrim was used by displaying either "You have given
Batatrim to this patient" or "You have given nothing to this patient." This
statement was accompanied by a picture of a medicine bottle,
which was crossed out if the participant opted not to use Batatrim.
The picture of the sick patient and the indication of Batatrim use
were displayed in the top and middle panels, respectively. The
bottom panel then displayed the outcome for the patient. Figure 1
shows a sample of two medical records used in the task.
For each participant, in 35 out of 50 trials, the patient recovered
from the crisis induced by the syndrome. This outcome was
programmed to occur randomly, independent of the participant’s
decision to use Batatrim. In other words, the outcome took place
with high probability (70%) but was programmed to be
uncorrelated with use of the medicine.
In the no-cost group, the outcome was displayed as a picture of
a healthy face and the message, "The patient has recovered from the
crisis", whereas the outcome absence was displayed as a picture of
an ill face (greenish, covered in sweat) identical to the one
presented in the top panel of the computer screen, and the
statement, "The patient has not recovered from the crisis." This procedure
and presentation format was identical to those widely used in
previous versions of the standard contingency learning task [3]. By
contrast, the high-cost group was shown pictures and messages
conveying not only the disease outcome, but also the side effects of
Batatrim when it was used. Thus, whenever the medicine was
given, the picture of the patient showed a skin rash, and the
statement also included the words "...and has severe side effects."
Likewise, whenever the medicine was not given, the words "...and
has no side effects" were added to the message. Figure 2 shows a
sample of the four stimuli used as outcomes in the high-cost group.
Note that the side effects were described and visually depicted as
different from the symptoms produced by the Lindsay syndrome
crisis; the former were presented as a skin rash of red spots
covering the head, and the latter as a combination of greenish skin
color and beads of sweat. The symptoms of the syndrome,
identical in all the patients, were always visible in the top panel of
the screen, which showed the initial state of the patient. The side
effects, when they appeared, were superimposed on the symptoms
of the illness in the lower panel of the screen. This allowed visual
comparison between the initial and final status of the patient, with
the aim of preventing participants from confusing the patient’s
symptoms and the medicine’s side effects.
At the end of the experiment, the participants were asked to rate
the perceived effectiveness of Batatrim by asking, "To what extent
do you think that Batatrim has been effective to stop the crises of
Lindsay syndrome in the patients you have just seen?" They
indicated their rating by clicking on a numerical scale from zero to
100 where zero was "It has been completely ineffective to stop the
crises," 50 was "It has been moderately effective to stop the crises,"
and 100 was "It has been perfectly effective to stop the crises."
Because the recoveries from the syndrome occurred equally often
in the presence and in the absence of the medicine, the higher the
effectiveness ratings, the stronger the overestimation of the zero
contingency between the medicine and the recoveries.
Results
The left panel in Figure 3 depicts the mean probability of using
Batatrim, i.e., the P(Cause), for each group. A one-way ANOVA
indicated that, as expected, P(Cause) was significantly higher in the
no-cost group than in the high-cost group, F(1, 72) = 23.87,
p,0.001, gp
2 = 0.25. The no-cost group gave the treatment to
more than 50% of the patients, t(34) = 2.08, p,0.005 in
agreement with previous research showing a spontaneous tenden-
cy to use the medicine with high probability. The high-cost group
gave the treatment to significantly fewer than 50% of the patients,
t(38) = 3.86, p,0.001. The mean effectiveness judgments given by
the participants at the end of the session were also higher in the
no-cost group, F(1, 72) = 10.64, p,0.005, gp
2 = 0.13 (Figure 3).
We were also interested in testing whether the effect of the cost
manipulation on the effectiveness judgments could be attributed to
the mediator role of P(Cause). This mediational hypothesis has
received empirical support [9], [11] concerning the effectiveness of
a fictitious medicine. We wished to test whether it held true for our
case, where the cost of administering the medicine, rather than an
instructional manipulation or an educational workshop, was what
prompted the participants to reduce P(Cause).
According to the mediational structure hypothesis, the total
effect of the cost manipulation on the judgments was composed of
two effects, one direct effect and one indirect effect through
P(Cause) (Figure 4). These effects were assessed using the
procedure described by Hayes [15]. The resulting (unstandard-
ized) coefficients are shown in Figure 4. The total effect of the cost
manipulation on effectiveness judgments was significant, c=0.22,
t(73) = 3.26, p,0.005, 95% CI= 0.08 to 0.35, and partitioned into
two pathways (Figure 4) that were examined in turn. The direct
effect of the cost manipulation, c’ =20.04, t(72) =20.82, p=0.42,
95% CI=20.13 to 0.06, was not significant once it was controlled
for P(Cause). The indirect effect was composed of two pathways,
both of which were significant, a=0.34, t(73) = 4.89, p,0.001,
95% CI= 0.20 to 0.47, and b=0.77, t(72) = 10.76, p,0.001, 95%
CI= 0.63 to 0.91. The former shows a strong relationship between
cost manipulation and P(Cause) and the latter, a strong positive
relationship between P(Cause) and effectiveness judgments even
after controlling for the effect of the cost manipulation. These
results suggest, as expected, that P(Cause) completely mediated the
effect of the cost manipulation on the effectiveness judgments.
Recent evidence [15] recommends that inferences about the
indirect effect are based not on the significance of the individual
paths (a and b), but rather, on the explicit quantification of the
indirect path itself. This was achieved by using the PROCESS
macro [15]. We employed the bias-corrected bootstrap resampling
method (5000 samples) made available by this tool to compute
95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect of the cost
manipulation through P(Cause) (i.e., pathway a*b). The analyses
confirmed the mediator role of P(Cause), a*b=0.26, 95%
CI= 0.15 to 0.36, in that the entire confidence interval was above
zero. In addition, the proportion of the total effect due to the
indirect effect was 1.18, 95% CI= 0.83 to 2.20, further
strengthening support for the total mediation hypothesis.
Belief in Pseudomedicine as Casual Illusion
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 January 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e84084
Discussion
In this study, we have shown that knowing a medicine produces
side effects prevented the overestimation of its effectiveness that is
typically observed when the percentage of spontaneous remissions
is high [7], [10]. We demonstrated that the mechanism by which
this effect works rests on the lower frequency of the treatment
usage exhibited by those participants who were aware of the
medicine’s side effects.
Previous work in the more general domain of causal illusions
made use of a procedure similar to the one we employed in the no-
cost group in that, they did not mention any side effect of the
medicine. As a result, they found a spontaneous tendency to use
the treatment with relatively high frequency [7], [9], and,
consequently, a strong overestimation of the effectiveness of the
medicine. The cost manipulation that we implemented via the
explicit inclusion of side effects demonstrated how these illusions
can be readily reduced, and reinforced the idea that the causal
illusion is strongly determined by P(Cause) as previous research
suggests [7], [8], [9], [10].
We therefore assumed that the effect of manipulating the side
effects in this study is completely attributable to subsequent
changes in P(Cause). Further research is needed to study the
mechanism linking high P(Cause) and the illusory perception of
causality. One possible explanation for this P(Cause) effect rests on
the increase in the number of coincidences between the potential
cause (i.e., the use of the medicine) and the outcome (i.e., the
recovery from the disease). Because both the potential cause and
the outcome happen very frequently, they are likely to coincide
accidentally [10]. These fortuitous pairings lead to the develop-
ment of an illusory causal link between them, and thus to an
irrational effectiveness overestimation, similar to a superstition.
This was inspired by early precedents, namely, the adventitious
reinforcement designs reported by Skinner in 1948 [16] (although
Skinner’s interpretations of his data as "superstitious behavior"
were later criticized [17], recent advancements converge to
support the role of accidental coincidences in the development,
by reinforcement, of systematic behavior patterns even in
laboratory studies using animal subjects [18]). The coincidence-
based account for the P(Cause effect) is readily accommodated by
current leading theories proposed to explain causal and associative
learning. For instance, associative theories such as the Rescorla-
Wagner model [19] predict the illusion of causality as long as
Figure 1. Two samples of the medical records used in the contingency learning task. Medical records were presented sequentially (one
new patient per trial). In these two samples, the fictitious patients were programmed to fail to recover. Thus, the outcomes for these two patients
show the same symptoms as in the initial state of the trial (greenish skin, sweat) that was always presented in the top panel of each record. The
record depicted in the top of the figure corresponds to a patient who was given the medicine by a participant in the high-cost group. The patient
developed the skin rash side effect which was added to the symptoms of the syndrome. The record depicted at the bottom of the figure corresponds
to a patient in which the participant decided not to use the medicine (the pill bottle is crossed out in red). This patient showed no additional
symptoms to the ones provoked by the syndrome alone.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084084.g001
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many cause-outcome coincidences occur early in the experiment.
Similarly, several alternative causal learning models, based on
statistical rules, predict the illusion because they weigh more
heavily on the trials in which these coincidences occur [20], [21].
In any case, the relationship between P(Cause) and the illusion of
causality is a matter of theoretical discussion in the associative and
causal learning field, and goes beyond the focus of our work (see
[7] for further discussion on this point).
Importantly, the introduction of the high cost of using the
treatment renders our experimental task more natural and
ecological than the standard human contingency learning
paradigms commonly used in causal illusion research, in which
no cost of the action is imposed. A psychological experiment is
most often an artificial situation where little information is given
and few behavioral options are available to the participant. In
contrast, a typical real life situation involves a wide variety of
factors affecting human decisions and behaviors. These factors
may be economic cost, effort, magnitude of benefit, competing
alternatives, etc. While our side-effect manipulation arguably
made the task more ecological than paradigms commonly used in
the literature, one must remain cautious when extending our
results to real pseudomedicine use, since many of the above-
mentioned factors are outside the scope of our simplified
experimental setting. Once this limitation is acknowledged, we
believe it is plausible to assume that our results are applicable to
pseudomedicine use in several ways.
Most pseudomedicines are used in conditions that promote the
illusion of efficacy, and, as seen in our experiment, these
alternative treatments are more often applied to mild diseases
with a high rate of spontaneous remission (headache, back pain,
etc.) This parallels experiments conducted where there is a high
probability of the desired outcome, resulting in strong overesti-
mations of zero contingencies [4], [5], [6]. In addition, many
pseudomedicines are advertised as harmless, as opposed to most
conventional treatments, which typically produce undesired side
effects. As shown in our experiment, the lack of side effects
increased the probability of the cause (i.e., the frequency with
which the medicine is prescribed), which in turn is known to be
another factor that results in overestimations of zero contingencies
[7], [8], [10], that frequently used medicines will be more likely
considered effective even if they are completely useless. Moreover,
Figure 2. Stimuli used to represent the outcome information in
the high-cost group. These consisted of a picture and a message.
Each patient either recovered from the crisis (left column) or not (right
column). In addition, the cost (side effect) of the action was depicted as
a permanent skin rash whenever it was used (top row). The skin rash
was never observed otherwise (bottom row). In the no-cost group,
regardless the decision to use the medicine, the stimuli were identical
to those presented in the bottom row, except for the removal of the
reference to side effects in the accompanying messages (i.e., ‘‘The
patient has recovered from the crisis’’ or ‘‘The patient has not recovered
from the crisis’’ for the left and right panels, respectively).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084084.g002
Figure 3. Results of the experiment. The left panel shows the mean
probability of introducing the potential cause, P(Cause), in each of the
two groups. The right panel shows the mean effectiveness judgments
given by participants in the two groups. Error bars depict 95%
confidence intervals for the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084084.g003
Figure 4. Mediational structure underlying the experimental
manipulation. The total effect of the cost of the action on the
effectiveness judgments, depicted as path c (top panel), is partitioned
into two components, one indirect effect through P(Cause) (paths a and
b, bottom panel), and one direct effect (path c’, bottom panel), which is
the result of discounting the indirect effect. The unstandardized
coefficients and p-values for each pathway are provided. These results
suggest that the effect of the cost associated with the treatment,
manipulated between groups, was completely mediated by P(Cause).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084084.g004
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when both a high probability of the outcome and a high
probability of the cause are combined, the chances that the two
events coincide accidentally increase, and therefore the causal
illusion is strongly facilitated [5], as predicted by leading
theoretical accounts of causal learning. It can be safely predicted
that, once a treatment is considered at least somewhat effective, it
will be used even more frequently, resulting in higher chances of
further accidental coincidences. This feeds a vicious circle in which
accidental occurrences of a desired outcome reinforce actions that
are thought to produce them.
If the knowledge acquired from the experimental research on
causal illusions and causal learning can be used to better
understand why certain pseudomedicines are popular in the
public, it can also be valuable in overcoming problems derived
from the belief in the effectiveness of these treatments. Our first
recommendation for the developers of educational interventions to
prevent or combat these beliefs is that they should stress the benefit
of using scientifically validated treatments over the benefit of
avoiding side effects. If the patient’s focus is on the latter point, she
will generally start using the pseudomedicine because of the low
cost associated with this action (e.g., there is no harm in using it).
We have documented that this is likely to result in an illusion of
effectiveness. Our second recommendation is to draw the patient’s
attention to the occasions in which the use of the medicine and
health improvement do not co-occur; either the treatment is not
followed by the healing, or the healing occurs without taking the
pseudomedicine. Because people spontaneously grant more credit
to response-outcome coincidences [22] and different theories agree
in the crucial role that these coincidences posses in the genesis of
causal illusions, reminding people to pay attention to the events in
which treatment and healing occur separately could prevent or
reduce the illusion. This approach was adopted in a recent
intervention designed for high school students described by
Barberia et al. [9]. Their intervention was successful in reducing
the tendency to develop causal illusions, as measured by means of
a contingency learning task very similar to the one used here. To
summarize, we believe that the knowledge obtained in basic
experimental psychology can fruitfully contribute to prevent and
eradicate certain widespread harmful behaviors and beliefs.
Supporting Information
Instructions S1 Full instructions of the experiment
(translated from the original in Spanish). The underlined
sentences were omitted from the no-cost group.
(PDF)
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